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FOREWORD
With the world riveted by Chinese aggressiveness
against Japan and Southeast Asian states in recent
years, one country has not been particularly surprised:
India. After all, New Delhi has been grappling with
the challenge of China’s rapid rise for some time now.
An uneasiness exists between the two Asian giants,
as they continue their ascent in the global interstate
hierarchy. Even as they sign loftily worded documents year after year, the distrust between the two is
actually growing at an alarming rate. True, economic
cooperation and bilateral political as well as sociocultural exchanges are at an all-time high; China is India’s largest trading partner. Yet this cooperation has
done little to assuage each country’s concerns about
the other’s intentions. The two sides are locked in a
classic security dilemma, where any action taken by
one is immediately interpreted by the other as a threat
to its interests.
India’s challenge remains formidable. While it has
not yet achieved the economic and political profile
that China enjoys regionally and globally, India is increasingly bracketed with China as a rising or emerging power—or even a global superpower. Indian elites
who have been obsessed with Pakistan for more than
60 years suddenly have found a new object of fascination. India’s main security concern now is not the increasingly decrepit state of Pakistan but an ever more
assertive China, a shift that is widely viewed inside
India as one that should facilitate better strategic planning. India’s defeat at Chinese hands in 1962 shaped
the Indian elite’s perceptions of China, and they are
unlikely to alter them anytime soon. China is, thus,
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viewed by India as a growing, aggressive nationalistic
power whose ambitions are likely to reshape the contours of the regional and global balance of power with
deleterious consequences for Indian interests.
This monograph comes at a time when the Asian
strategic landscape is undergoing a dramatic transformation. Accordingly, the author, Dr. Harsh V. Pant,
examines the evolving trajectory of Indian policy towards China and underscores the implications for the
region, and the United States in particular, at a time
when U.S.-India ties are also evolving rapidly.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer
this monograph as part of its continuing effort to inform the debate on Asia’s future, and to help strategic
leaders to better understand the realities of the contemporary Asian strategic landscape.
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
According to most political observers, the global
political architecture is undergoing a transformation
with power increasingly shifting from the West to the
East, in what has been called the Asian Century. The
two most populous nations on the earth, China and
India, are on their way to becoming economic powerhouses and are shedding their reticence in asserting
their global profiles, all of which makes their relationship of still greater importance for the international
system. The future of this Asian Century will, to a
large extent, depend upon the relationship between
these two regional giants, and the bilateral relationship between them will define the contours of the new
international political architecture in Asia and the
world at large. This monograph examines the evolution of Sino-Indian ties over the last few decades and
the constraints that continue to inhibit this relationship from achieving its full potential before delineating the implications of this for the United States and
the wider international system.
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THE GROWING COMPLEXITY
OF SINO-INDIAN TIES
INTRODUCTION
According to most political observers, the global
political architecture is undergoing a transformation
with power increasingly shifting from the West to the
East, in what has been called the Asian Century. The
two most populous nations on the earth, China and
India, are on their way to becoming economic powerhouses and are shedding their reticence in asserting
their global profiles, all of which makes their relationship of still greater importance for the international
system. The future of this Asian Century will, to a
large extent, depend upon the relationship between
these two regional giants, and the bilateral relationship between them will define the contours of the new
international political architecture in Asia and the
world at large. The importance of their relationship
has not been lost on either country. In one of his meetings with the Indian Prime Minister, at the 2004 AsiaEurope Meeting (ASEM), former Chinese Premier
Wen Jiabao is reported to have remarked that “when
we shake hands, the whole world will be watching,” a
sentiment repeated by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during his visit to China in October 2013.
As of today, however, the trajectory of the Sino-Indian
relationship remains as complex as ever to decipher,
despite some positive developments in the last few
years. This monograph examines the evolution of
Sino-India ties over the last few decades and the constraints that continue to inhibit this relationship from
achieving its full potential before delineating the implications of this for the United States and the wider
international system.
1

BACKGROUND
Initial Encounters.
As two ancient civilizations, India and China have
had cultural and trade ties since at least the first century. The famous Silk Road allowed for economic and
trade ties to develop between the two, with the transmission of Buddhism from India to China giving a
further cultural dimension to the relationship between
the two neighbors. The political ties between China
and India, however, remained underdeveloped.
Independent India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, saw anti-imperialist friendship between the
two largest states of Asia as imperative if interference
by the two external superpowers was to be avoided.1
Solidarity with China was integral to Nehru’s vision of
Asian leadership. After the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) was established in 1949 and India established
diplomatic ties with it in 1950, India not only advocated for the PRC’s membership at the United Nations
(UN) but also opposed attempts to condemn the PRC
for its actions in Korea. Yet, the issue of Tibet soon
emerged as the major bone of contention between China and India. China was suspicious of Indian designs
on Tibet, which India sought to allay by supporting the
Seventeen-Point Agreement between Tibetan delegates
and China in 1951 that recognized PRC sovereignty
over Tibet and guaranteed the existing socio-political
arrangements of Tibet. India and China signed the
famed Panchshila agreement in 1954 that underlined
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as forming the
basis of their bilateral relationship.2 These principles
included mutual respect for each other’s territorial
integrity and sovereignty; mutual nonaggression; mu-
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tual noninterference in each other’s internal affairs;
equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.
These were the hey-days of Sino-Indian ties, with the
Hindi-China bhai-bhai (“Indians and Chinese are brothers”) phrase a favorite slogan for the seeming camaraderie between the two states.
But that was not to last long. Soon the border dispute between China and India escalated and led to
the 1962 Sino-Indian war.3 Though a short war, it was
to have a long-lasting impact on Sino-Indian ties. It
demolished Nehru’s claims of Asian solidarity, and
the defeat at the hands of the Chinese psychologically
scarred Indian military and political elites. It led to
China developing close ties with India’s neighboring
adversary, Pakistan, resulting in what is now widely
considered an “all-weather” friendship. China supported Pakistan in its 1965 and 1971 wars with India
and helped in the development of its nuclear weapons arsenal. Meanwhile, the Indian nuclear weapons
program was accelerated in light of China’s testing of
nuclear weapons in 1964.
The border issue remains a major obstacle in SinoIndian ties, with minor skirmishes at the border continuing since 1962. As China and the United States became closer after their rapprochement in 1972, India
gravitated to the former Soviet Union to balance the
China-U.S.-Pakistan axis. It was in 1988 that then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi turned a new leaf in
Sino-Indian ties when he went to Beijing and signed an
agreement that aimed at achieving a “fair and reasonable settlement while seeking a mutually acceptable
solution to the border dispute.”4 The visit saw a Joint
Working Group (JWG) set up to explore the boundary
issue and examine probable solutions to the problem.
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However, bilateral relations between India and the
PRC touched their nadir in the immediate aftermath
of India’s nuclear tests in May 1998. China had been
singled out as the “number one” security threat for India by India’s Defence Minister just before the nuclear
tests.5 After the tests, the Indian Prime Minister wrote
to the U.S. President justifying Indian nuclear tests as
a response to the threat posed by China:
We have an overt nuclear weapons state [China] on
our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with
that country have improved in the last decade or so,
an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the
unresolved border problem. To add to the distrust,
that country has materially helped another neighbour of ours [Pakistan] to become a covert nuclear
weapons state.6

Not surprisingly, China reacted strongly, with diplomatic relations between the two countries plummeting to an all time low.
However, after more than a decade, the relations
between the two countries, at least superficially, seem
to be on a much firmer footing as they have tried to
reduce the prospect for rivalry and expand areas of
cooperation. The visit of the Indian External Affairs
Minister to China in 1999 marked the resumption of
high-level dialogue, as the two sides declared that
they were not threats to each other. A bilateral security dialogue was also initiated that has helped the
two countries in openly expressing and sharing their
security concerns with each other. Both China and
India continue to emphasize that neither side should
let differences act as an impediment to the growth of
functional cooperation elsewhere between the two
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states. India and China also decided to expedite the
process of demarcation of the Line of Actual Control
(LAC), and the JWG on the boundary question, set
up in 1988, has been meeting regularly. As a first step
in this direction, the two countries exchanged border
maps on the least controversial Middle Sector of the
LAC. More recently, both nations agreed on Political
Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the
India-China Boundary Question (2005), broad principles
to govern the parameters of any dispute settlement.
China has expressed its desire to seek a fair resolution
to the vexed boundary issue on the basis of “mutual
accommodation, respect for history, and accommodation of reality.”7
Diplomacy of Declarations.
Former Indian Prime Minster Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China in June 2003, the first by an Indian
Premier in a decade. The Joint Declaration signed during this visit expressed the view that China was not
a threat to India.8 The two states appointed Special
Representatives in order to impart momentum to border negotiations that have lasted now for more than
20 years, with the Prime Minister’s principal secretary
becoming India’s political-level negotiator, replacing
the India-China JWG. India and China also decided to
hold their first joint naval and air exercises. More significantly, India acknowledged China’s sovereignty
over Tibet and pledged not to allow anti-China political activities in India. For its part, China seems to have
finally acknowledged India’s 1975 incorporation of
the former monarchy of Sikkim, by agreeing to open
a trading post along the border with the former kingdom and later by rectifying its official maps to include
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Sikkim as part of India.9 After being closed for 60 years,
the Nathu La pass, a traditional trading post between
Tibet and Sikkim, was reopened in 2006. High-level
political interactions have continued unabated since
then. The two states have set up institutionalized defense consultation mechanisms to reduce suspicions
and identify areas of cooperation on security issues.
Soon after assuming office, the Manmohan Singh
government made it clear that it desired closer ties
with China and would continue to work towards improving bilateral relations with China. India’s former
national security advisor, J. N. Dixit, wrote that “the
Congress will continue the process of normalizing,
strengthening and expanding India’s relations with
China, which is the most important factor affecting
Asian security and stability.”10 In his first address to
the nation, Prime Minister Singh also emphasized the
carrying forward of the process of further development and diversification of Sino-Indian relations.11
When Singh visited China in 2008, the two states
signed A Shared Vision for the 21st Century of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India declaration: “to promote the building of a harmonious world
of durable peace and common prosperity through
developing the Strategic and Cooperative Partnership
for Peace and Prosperity between the two countries.”12
Support for the earlier Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the
China-India Boundary Question (2005) was reiterated.
The two sides have decided to elevate the boundary
negotiations to the level of a strategic dialogue, with
plans for a hotline between the Indian Prime Minister
and the Chinese Premier as a means to remove misunderstanding and reduce tensions at the earliest possible instance. Their public vision suggested that this
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relationship would have “a positive influence on the
future of the international system.”13 The two nations
signed the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement
(BDCA) in 2013 aimed at curbing incidents along the
border that inflame public passions.
This has been ongoing at a time when economic
relations between the two have been burgeoning, with
China emerging as India’s largest trading partner. The
Sino-Indian trade is on course to achieve a volume of
$100 billion by 2015, providing a basis for long-term
engagement.
Global Engagement.
It is at the international level, however, that India and China have found some real convergence of
interests. Both share similar concerns about U.S. international dominance, the threat of fundamentalist
religious and ethnic movements in the form of terrorism, and the need to accord primacy to economic
development. India and China have both expressed
concern about the U.S. use of military power around
the world, and both were publicly opposed to the war
in Iraq. This was merely a continuation of the desire
of both states to oppose the U.S. hyperpuissance since
the end of the Cold War.
Both China and India, much like other major
powers in the international system, favor a multipolar world order where U.S. unipolarity remains constrained by the other “poles” in the system. China and
India zealously guard their national sovereignty and
have been wary of U.S. attempts to interfere in what
they see as domestic affairs of other states, be it in Serbia, Kosovo, Iraq, or more recently, Libya and Syria.
Both took strong exception to the U.S. air strikes on
Iraq in 1998, the U.S.-led air campaign against Yugo7

slavia in 1999, and the U.S. campaign against Saddam
Hussein, arguing that these violated the sovereignty
of both countries and undermined the authority of
the UN system.14 China and India share an interest in
resisting interventionist foreign policy doctrines emanating from the West, particularly the United States,
and display “conservative attitudes on the prerogatives of sovereignty.”15
China and India have coordinated their efforts on
issues as wide-ranging as climate change, trade negotiations, energy security, and the global financial
crisis. Both nations favor more democratic international economic regimes. Sino-Indian coordination
on climate change, global trade negotiations, as well
as in demanding a restructuring of financial institutions in view of the world economy’s shifting center
of gravity has had a significant impact on the course
of international politics over the last few years. It is
being argued that the forces of globalization have led
to a certain convergence of Sino-Indian interests in the
economic realm, as the two nations become even more
deeply engaged in the international trading economy
and more integrated in global financial networks.16
The two have strongly resisted efforts by the United States and other developed nations to link global
trade to labor and environmental standards, realizing
clearly that this would put them at a huge disadvantage in relation to the developed world, thereby hampering their drive towards economic development,
the number one priority for both countries. Both have
committed themselves to crafting joint Sino-Indian
positions in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
global trade negotiations in the hope that this might
provide them greater negotiating leverage over other
developed states. They would like to see further liberalization of agricultural trade in the developed coun8

tries, tightening of the rules on anti-dumping measures, and ensuring that nontrade related issues such
as labor and environment are not allowed to come to
the WTO. Both have fought carbon emission caps proposed by the industrialized world and have resisted
Western pressure to open their agricultural markets.
It is against an increasingly complex strategic background that states such as China and India are trying
to shape their own energy policies. Their approach toward their energy predicament remains rather traditional insofar as it is largely state-centric, supply-side
biased, mainly reliant on oil, and tends to privilege
self-sufficiency.17 It is toward an aggressive pursuit
of energy resources, particularly oil, across the globe
that China and India seem to have focused their diplomatic energies in recent years, with some far-reaching
implications.
Both China and India are feeling the pressure of diminishing oil discoveries and flat-lined oil production
at a time when expansion of their domestic economies
is rapidly increasing demand for energy. They have
made energy the focal point of their diplomatic overtures to states far and wide. More significantly, faced
with a market in which politics has an equal, if not
greater, influence on price as does economics, the two
have also decided to coordinate their efforts to secure
energy resources overseas. In essence, China and India plan to work together to secure energy resources
without unnecessarily bidding up the price of those
resources, thereby agreeing to a consumer’s cartel representing 2.3 billion potential consumers. Together,
their combined markets and purchasing power offers
an extremely attractive partner to energy-producing
states, especially the ones that face Western pressure
over their human rights records or the nature of their
political institutions.
9

It has been argued by many that cooperation between China and India on energy issues is the only
way ahead if both states want to gain economies of
scale and negotiation muscle. In many ways, both
states face similar constraints in achieving energy security and a coordinated approach would benefit them
both. Competition only ends up driving up the costs of
acquisition, thereby diminishing future returns. There
has been a recognition of this at the highest levels of
the government in both states.
China and India have signed a range of memoranda on energy cooperation that covers a full scope of areas, including upstream exploration and production,
the refining and marketing of petroleum products and
petrochemicals, the laying of national and transnational oil and gas pipelines, frontier and cutting-edge
research and development, and the promotion of
environment-friendly fuels.18
The two states have agreed to strengthen the exchange of information when bidding for oil resources in a third party country in order to realize mutual
benefit. China has pledged to promote cooperation
with India in civil nuclear energy and to view this
cooperation in the context of climate change and increasing nonpolluting sources in the energy mix. The
former Indian petroleum minister, Mani Shankar Aiyar, made it clear that he thought that India and China
joining hands to bid jointly for oil and gas assets under a “monopsonistic” arrangement was much better
than the two states competing in their quest for energy
resources.19 He had even floated the idea of an Asian
energy grid that might follow the trajectory of the European Coal and Steel Community, which grew into
the European Union (EU). According to Aiyar, “India
and China don’t have to go through fratricide in order
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to arrive at the conclusion that it is better to cooperate
on energy security.”20
From Global to Bilateral: Without Much Success.
The attempt on the part of China in recent years
has been to build its bilateral relationship with India
on the basis of the larger worldview of international politics on the part of both nations. As New Delhi and Beijing discovered a distinct convergence of
their interests on the world stage, they have used it to
strengthen their bilateral relations. They have established and maintained regular reciprocal high-level
visits between political leaders. There has been a serious attempt to improve trade relations and China has
sought to compartmentalize intractable issues with
India that make it difficult for their bilateral relationship to move forward.
At the global level, the rhetoric is all about cooperation, and indeed the two sides have worked together
on climate change, global trade negotiations and demanding a restructuring of global financial institutions in view of the global economy’s shifting center
of gravity.21 At the bilateral level, however, mounting tensions reached an impasse in 2009, when China
took its territorial dispute with India all the way to
the Asian Development Bank. There China blocked
India’s application for a loan that included money for
development projects in the Indian state of Arunachal
Pradesh, which China continues to claim as part of its
own territory.22 The suggestion by the Chinese to the
U.S. Pacific Fleet commander in 2009 that the Indian
Ocean should be recognized as a Chinese sphere of
influence also raised hackles in New Delhi.23 China’s
lack of support for the U.S.-India civilian nuclear en-
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ergy cooperation pact, which it tried to block at the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and its obstructionist
stance about bringing the terror masterminds of the
November 2008 Mumbai attacks to justice have further strained ties.
Sino-Indian frictions are growing, and the potential for conflict remains high. Alarm is rising in India
because of frequent and strident Chinese claims about
the Line of Actual Control in Arunachal Pradesh and
Sikkim, where Indians have complained of a dramatic
rise in Chinese intrusions into Indian territory over
the last few years, most along the border in Arunachal
Pradesh, which China refers to as “Southern Tibet.”
China has upped the ante on the border issue. It has
been regularly protesting against the Indian Prime
Minister’s visits to Arunachal Pradesh over the last
few years, asserting its claims over the territory. What
has caught most observers of Sino-Indian ties by surprise, however, is the vehemence with which Beijing
has contested recent Indian administrative and political action in the state, even denying visas to Indian
citizens of Arunachal Pradesh. The recent rounds of
boundary negotiations have been a disappointing failure, with a growing perception in India that China is
less willing to adhere to earlier political understandings about how to address the boundary dispute.
The possibility of an intimate U.S.-India military
relationship has generated fears of encirclement in
Beijing. India’s position astride China’s key maritime
shipping lanes has made the prospect of a Washington-Delhi axis particularly worrisome. Pakistan, of
course, has always been a crucial foreign policy asset for China, but with India’s rise and U.S.-India
rapprochement, its role in China’s grand strategy is
bound to grow even further. Not surprisingly, recent
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revelations about China shifting away from a 3-decades’ old cautious approach on Jammu and Kashmir,
increasing its military presence in Pakistan, planning
infrastructure linking Xinjiang and Gwadar, issuing
stapled visas to residents of Jammu and Kashmir and
supplying nuclear reactors to Pakistan, all confirm a
new intensity behind China’s old strategy of using
Pakistan to secure its interests in the region. China has
gone even further than Pakistan in defining the Kashmir issue. While Pakistan insists that Kashmir is a disputed territory, recent Chinese positions have made it
clear that Beijing believes Pakistan occupied Kashmir
(PoK) is Pakistani territory with India’s Kashmir state
being the only part of the province that is disputed.24
Pakistan seems to have ceded responsibility for the
Gilgit-Baltistan area of PoK to China as the reported
presence of 7,000-10,000 People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) troops there underscores.25 The real concern for
India, however, is the number of projects that China
has undertaken in these areas, and that footprint is
likely to increase.26
China’s economic transformation has given it the
capability to emerge as a major military power as it
continues to announce double-digit increases in its
military spending. China’s military may or may not be
able to take on the United States in the next few years,
but it will surely become the most dominant force in
Asia. As a consequence of its growing capabilities,
China has started asserting its military profile more
significantly than before. Since 2009, Chinese vessels
have been tackling Somali pirates in the Middle East,
the first time Chinese vessels operated outside Asia.
Beijing has also started sending combat troops abroad
in support of UN peacekeeping efforts.
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China’s sustained military build-up will continue
over the next few years and will pose a challenge to
Indian military planners as the Indian military’s modernization program is fast losing momentum. As the
policy paralysis post-Mumbai has revealed, India
seems to have lost even its conventional superiority
over Pakistan. The real challenge for India, however,
lies in China’s rise as a military power. India is speeding up its defense procurement but the process remains mired in bureaucratese and lacks any sense of
strategic direction.27 According to an estimate by the
Indian government’s own China Study Group, China
now possesses the capability to move more than 10,000
troops to the Indian border in 20 to 25 days, compared
to 3 to 6 months a decade ago.28 This is possible because
of China’s efficient border management, and it has
forced India into urgently constructing border roads.
By engaging in repeated, though controlled, provocations, the Chinese military is carefully probing how
far it can push India. The new military restiveness on
the Sino-Indian border does not bode well for India
as the military balance along the long and contested
border is rapidly altering in Beijing’s favor. It is not
without reason that China has upgraded its military
and civilian infrastructure in Xinjiang and Tibet. As a
consequence, Tibet has become a militarized zone.
CURRENT ISSUES
China’s Naval Power Projection.
China is acquiring naval bases along the crucial
choke points in the Indian Ocean not only to serve
its economic interests but also to enhance its strategic
presence in the region. There is enough evidence to
suggest that China is comprehensively building up
14

its maritime power in all dimensions.29 It is China’s
growing dependence on maritime space and resources that is reflected in the Chinese aspiration to expand
its influence and ultimately to dominate the strategic
environment of the Indian Ocean region. Its growing
reliance on bases across the Indian Ocean region is a
response to its perceived vulnerability, given the logistical constraints that it faces due to the distance of
the Indian Ocean waters from its own area of operation. Yet, China is consolidating power over the South
China Sea and the Indian Ocean with an eye on India,
something that comes out clearly in a secret memorandum issued by the Director of the General Logistic Department of the PLA: “We can no longer accept
the Indian Ocean as only an ocean of the Indians.
. . . We are taking armed conflicts in the region into
account.”30
China has deployed its Jin class submarines at a
base near Sanya on the southern tip of Hainan Island
in the South China Sea, raising alarm in India as the
base is merely 1,200 nautical miles from the Malacca
Strait and will be its closest access point to the Indian
Ocean. The base also has an underground facility that
can hide the movement of submarines, making them
difficult to detect.31 The concentration of strategic naval forces at Sanya will further propel China towards
a consolidation of its control over the surrounding Indian Ocean region. The presence of access tunnels on
the mouth of the deep water base is particularly troubling for India as it will have strategic implications in
the Indian Ocean region, allowing China to interdict
shipping at the three crucial choke points in the Indian
Ocean. The choice of Hainan is poor, but no alternatives exist as other places are hemmed in by islands.
So China’s chief maritime nuclear base is also what is
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for now her southernmost point. She would want the
waters around it clear so that, among other things, no
one can track her submarines.
As the ability of China’s navy to project power in
the Indian Ocean grows, India is likely to feel even
more vulnerable despite enjoying distinct geographical advantages in the region. China’s growing naval
presence in and around the Indian Ocean region is
troubling for India as it restricts India’s freedom to
maneuver in the region. Of particular note is what
has been termed China’s “string of pearls” strategy
that has significantly expanded its strategic depth in
India’s backyard.32
This string of pearls strategy of bases and diplomatic ties include the Gwadar port in Pakistan, naval
bases in Burma, electronic intelligence gathering facilities on islands in the Bay of Bengal, funding construction of a canal across the Kra Isthmus in Thailand, a
military agreement with Cambodia, and building up
of forces in the South China Sea.33 Some of the Indian
claims relating to these developments are exaggerated as has been the case with the Chinese naval presence in Burma. The Indian government, for example,
had to concede in 2005 that reports of China turning
the Coco Islands in Burma into a naval base were incorrect, and that there were, indeed, no naval bases in
Burma.34 Yet the Chinese thrust into the Indian Ocean
is gradually becoming more pronounced. The Chinese
may not have a naval base in Burma but they are involved in the upgrade of infrastructure in the Coco
Islands and may be providing some limited technical
assistance to Burma. Given that almost 80 percent of
China’s oil passes through the Strait of Malacca, it is
reluctant to rely on U.S. naval power for unhindered
access to energy and so has decided to build up its
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naval power at “choke points” along the sea routes
from the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea. China
is also courting other states in South Asia by building
container ports in Bangladesh at Chittagong and in Sri
Lanka at Hambantota. Consolidating its access to the
Indian Ocean, China has signed an agreement with
Sri Lanka to finance the development of the Hambantota Development Zone, which includes a container
port, a bunker system, and an oil refinery. It is possible that the construction of these ports and facilities
around India’s periphery by China can be explained
away on purely economic and commercial grounds
but for India this looks like a policy of containment by
other means.
China’s involvement in the construction of the
deep-sea port of Gwadar has attracted a lot of attention due to its strategic location, about 70 kilometers
from the Iranian border and 400 kilometers east of the
Strait of Hormuz, a major oil supply route. It has been
suggested that it will provide China with a listening
post from where it can “monitor US naval activity in
the Persian Gulf, Indian activity in the Arabian Sea,
and future US-Indian maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean.”35 Though Pakistan’s naval capabilities
do not, on their own, pose any challenge to India, the
combinations of Chinese and Pakistani naval forces
can, indeed, be formidable for India to counter.
China would certainly like to play a greater role
in the region, protect and advance its interests, especially its commerce, as well as countering India. But
given the immense geographical advantages that India enjoys in the Indian Ocean, China will have great
difficulty in exerting as much sway there as India
can. China’s assertion of its naval prowess, however,
is raising vexing issues regarding the role of Indian
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naval power in the Indian Ocean. The Indian and Chinese navies are growing and acquiring the capability
to operate at long distances. The Sino-Indian strategic relationship is rapidly evolving and tensions are
building up as was underlined in an incident in 2009
when an Indian Kilo class submarine and Chinese warships, on their way to the Gulf of Aden to patrol the
pirate-infested waters, reportedly engaged in rounds
of maneuvering as they tried to test for weaknesses
in each other’s sonar systems. The Chinese media reported that its warships forced the Indian submarine
to the surface, which was strongly denied by the Indian navy.36 Another incident led to an unidentified
Chinese warship demanding that the INS Airavat, an
Indian amphibious assault vessel, identify itself and
explain its presence in the South China Sea after the
vessel left Vietnamese waters in July 2011.37 The Indian warship was completing a scheduled port call in
Vietnam and was in international waters. Though the
Indian Navy promptly denied that a Chinese warship
had confronted its assault vessel, it did not completely
deny the factual basis of the report. Maritime friction
is likely to grow as the Indian Navy tries to expand its
footprint in the South China Sea and the Western Pacific even as the Chinese Navy increases its presence
in the Indian Ocean. It is India’s fears and perceptions
of the growing naval prowess of China in the Indian
Ocean that is driving Indian naval posture.
The Nuclear Issue.
China remains the only major power in the world
that refuses to discuss nuclear issues with India for
fear that this might imply a de facto recognition of India’s status as a nuclear power. It continues to insist on
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the sanctity of UN Resolution 1172, which calls for India (and Pakistan) to give up its nuclear weapons program and join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) as a non-nuclear weapons state.38 For the same
reason, China refuses to discuss nuclear confidence
building and risk reduction measures with India. It is
interesting that a large section of China’s political and
military elite views India’s nuclear tests in 1998, not as
an attempt by India to address its security concerns,
but rather a U.S. attempt to contain China insofar as
the United States “allowed” India to go nuclear.39
The U.S.-India civilian nuclear energy cooperation
pact came as a shock to Beijing. China made every
possible effort to scuttle the deal until the last minute.
It made its displeasure with the nuclear pact clear by
asking India to sign the NPT and dismantle its nuclear
weapons. Since the U.S.-India deal is in many ways a
recognition of India’s rising global profile, China, not
surprisingly, was not very happy with the outcome
and quickly declared that it would be selling new nuclear reactors to Pakistan. It was a not so subtle message to the United States that if Washington decided
to play favorites, China also retained the same right.
Beijing viewed the nuclear deal through the lens of
the global balance of power and was perturbed about
the U.S. desire to build India as a balancer in the region. China was opposed to an exemption for India
from the NSG guidelines, even threatening to walk
out of the NSG proceedings at Vienna in 2008 in its
attempts to derail negotiations at the 11th hour. The
Chinese leadership refused to receive the Indian Prime
Minister’s call during the crisis. Only when the other
states were persuaded by the United States to support
the deal and China realized that it would be the last
state standing, did it back off from its obstruction-
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ist stance. China’s actions with regard to the nuclear
pact have conveyed to India that even as India tries
hard to break out of the straitjacket of being a South
Asian power by forging a strategic partnership with
the United States, China will do its utmost to contain
India by building up its neighboring adversaries.
To counter the U.S.-India nuclear pact, China
has decided to allow its state entities to supply two
new nuclear reactors to Pakistan. Chinese authorities
have confirmed that the state-owned China National
Nuclear Corporation has signed an agreement with
Pakistan for two new nuclear reactors at the Chashma site—Chashma III and Chashma IV—in addition
to the two it is already working on in Pakistan. This
action of China will be in clear violation of the NSG
guidelines that forbid nuclear transfers to countries
not signatories to the NPT or which adhere to comprehensive international safeguards on their nuclear
program. China has suggested that “there are compelling political reasons concerning the stability of
South Asia to justify the exports,” echoing Pakistan’s
oft-repeated complaint that the U.S.-India nuclear
pact has upset stability in the region by assisting India’s strategic program.40 Unlike the much debated
U.S.-India nuclear pact, the Sino-Pakistani agreement
is mired in secrecy with Beijing even ready to shortcircuit the NSG process. Disregarding Indian and
global concerns, China has contended that the sale of
two new reactors is “grandfathered” from before it
joined the NSG in 2004, and therefore an exemption
from the NSG is not required. The decision to supply
reactors to Pakistan, a nonsignatory to the NPT and
with a record of dealing with North Korea, Iran, and
Libya, reflects China’s growing diplomatic confidence
and underscores its view of Pakistan as a prized South
Asian strategic power.
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The Pakistani nuclear weapons program is essentially an extension of the Chinese one. China’s
crucial role in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear
infrastructure is well documented. Although China
has long denied helping any nation attain a nuclear
capability, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, himself has acknowledged the crucial role China has played in his nation’s nuclear weaponization by gifting 50 kilograms
of weapons grade enriched uranium, drawings of
the nuclear weapons, and tons of uranium hexafluoride for Pakistan’s centrifuges. This is perhaps the
only case where a nuclear weapons state has actually
passed on weapons grade fissile material as well as
a bomb design to a non-nuclear weapons state. The
Sino-Pakistani collusion on nuclear issues has continued despite China being a signatory to the NPT.
Moreover, while both India and China have a “nofirst-use” nuclear doctrine, China’s doctrine is not applicable to India as India is not a party to the NPT.
China’s “minimum nuclear doctrine” has changed to
“limited nuclear doctrine,” suggesting a nuclear warfighting capability. It has been estimated that the Chinese nuclear arsenal of about 500 warheads comprises
200 strategic warheads, while the rest are of a tactical
nature. Those tactical warheads are deployed at about
20 locations in China, including Tibet, and are well integrated at the operational level. On the other hand,
India’s no-first-use pledge and minimum deterrence
posture have precluded the possession of tactical nuclear weapons, leading to a serious operational shortcoming as well as depriving India of an appropriate
level of deterrence against China. India may well have
to attain parity with China’s strategic nuclear forces in
order to successfully counter its aggressively coercive
bargaining vis-à-vis India.
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Among the five nuclear powers, it is China that
is making the most dramatic advances in its nuclear
force with the introduction and deployment of new
generation land-based ballistic missiles and nuclear
submarines. Sino-Indian competition in the nuclear
arena is intensifying after China decided to upgrade
its missile facilities near Tibet in 2007, bringing targets
in northern India within range of its forces. The Indian
Army is in the process of incorporating Agni-III, its
intermediate range missile, which is capable of reaching all of China’s major cities, and has successfully
tested the nuclear-capable, 5,000-kilometer range Agni-V ballistic missile to bolster its deterrence posture
against China. India’s no-first-use nuclear doctrine
relies fundamentally on a credible second strike capability. The Agni-V, by bringing the Chinese heartland into India’s missile orbit, makes the Sino-Indian
nuclear dynamic more stable than before.
India has also shifted a squadron of its most advanced multirole fighter aircraft, Su-30MKI, to a base
just 150 kilometers from the disputed Sino-Indian
border. New Delhi is considering missile defense
systems, including the U.S. Patriot-3 and Israel’s Iron
Dome and David’s Sling, in response to the Chinese
military’s plan to place Dongfeng-21 medium-range
ballistic missiles on the Tibetan plateau.41 India’s indigenous ballistic missile defense (BMD) program has
been accelerated and is now considered ready for integration into the nation’s air defense assets. Its Defence
Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)
has suggested that by 2013–14, the system would include phase-I missiles, capable of neutralizing incoming missiles at the 2,000-kilometer range. With an eye
on China, phase-II will be aimed at thwarting threats
from missiles up to 5,000 kilometers.42 After China
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demonstrated its test-firing capability in space, India
has suggested that it remains open to extending the
BMD program to that arena, although its official policy remains one of staunch opposition to any attempt
to place weapons in space.
Border Tensions.
China has vigorously asserted its old claims along
the border with India and has combined the assertion
with aggressive patrolling. Violating the 1993 IndiaChina agreement on peace and tranquility on the Line
of Actual Control, Chinese troops have been engaging
Indian troops in verbal abuses, asking them to leave
their own territory. Even as India considered the Sikkim border issue settled, repeated Chinese incursions
in the Finger Area in northern Sikkim in the past few
years are aimed at opening a fresh front against India.
Beijing has decided to put the historically undisputed
border with Sikkim back into contestation. Concerns
are growing about covert Chinese intrusions into the
Indian territory to strengthen its claims on the disputed border areas. Chinese forces are regularly intruding
into Bhutanese territory at the tri-junction with India
and destroying Indian Army posts.43 These incursions
are strategically aimed as they are precariously close
to India’s “chicken-neck”—the Siliguri corridor which
links the northeast passage. Chinese intrusions into
the nondelineated parts of Bhutan’s northern border
with Tibet are also aimed at forcing Bhutan to settle its
boundary issue with China. In April 2013, a Chinese
military patrol set up camps several kilometers within
the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control. This was
the first time since 1986 that Chinese troops have refused to vacate their positions after being discovered.
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After it emerged that the Chinese patrol had pitched
camp in the Despang area of Ladakh, Indian media
reported that two Chinese helicopters violated Indian
airspace in an attempt to provide air cover to the soldiers. New Delhi summoned the Chinese ambassador
immediately and sent military reinforcements to the
region. It took China 3 weeks to order the military to
go back.
China’s rapid expansion and modernization of its
transport infrastructure across the border is forcing
India to respond though India is already decades behind. The build-up of infrastructure in Tibet should
have rung alarm bells in Delhi long back, but no response was forthcoming. China’s transportation modernization plans across the Himalayas had been evident for decades. Yet India chose to be lackadaisical
in its approach without demonstrating a sense of urgency that this critical national security requirement
demanded. Improved infrastructure helped China to
rapidly deploy troops in Tibet when riots broke out
there in 2008. The railway link between Beijing and
Lhasa further tightens China’s grip on Tibet. China’s
ambition is to extend the Beijing-Lhasa rail line to Yatung just a few miles from Sikkim’s Nathu La and subsequently extend this to Nyingchi, north of Arunachal
Pradesh, at the tri-junction with Myanmar. China’s
ambitions about the development of its border areas
contrast vividly with India’s tentative stance on infrastructure development.
China’s transformation of the transport infrastructure in Yunnan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, the provinces that
border South Asia, and its decision to build road and
rail networks across the borders of these areas has
transformed geopolitics in India’s vicinity. India is
struggling to cope with the decay in its border infra-
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structure.44 It has only recently started building several tactically important roads along the China border in
the eastern and western sectors. A number of airstrips
are being upgraded so as to give India the ability to
deploy a large number of troops in forward areas on
short notice. Myanmar has agreed to allow China to
use its land to build a highway to connect Kunming
in its southeast with Chittagong in Bangladesh. Once
built, the highway will allow China direct access to
the Bay of Bengal, and it will run very close to the
northeastern Indian states of Tripura and Mizoram.
China has set up an in-house training facility for Su-30
fighter aircraft pilots of the Indonesian Air Force at
the Hasanuddin Air Base where the unit is based. As
a result, Chinese pilots will be flying much closer to
India’s Andaman Nicobar Islands.
The penetration of China into the Indian intelligence apparatus is growing to the consternation of
many. India’s premier National Informatics Centre,
which governs and hosts all government websites as
well as computers of the Prime Minister’s Office, the
Ministry of External Affairs, several Indian embassies,
the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, and the Dalai
Lama were infected by GhostNet, a China-based cyber
espionage network.45 Though this came to light in early 2009, it has been going on for the last several years.
China has been giving cyber warfare serious thought
and has incorporated it into its military planning and
strategy by encouraging civilian computer hackers to
penetrate the computer networks of key political and
military leaders in countries ranging from the United
States to Japan, Taiwan, India and South Korea.
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India Balances a Rising China.
China’s recent hardening toward India might well
be a function of its own internal vulnerabilities, but that
is hardly a consolation to Indian policymakers who
have to respond to a public that increasingly wants
the country to assert itself in the region and beyond.
New Delhi has responded to the challenge posed by
a rising China by adopting a more hard-nosed policy
vis-à-vis Beijing.
While there has always been and continues to be
a range of opinions in India on how best to deal with
China, a consensus seems to be evolving among the
highest echelons of military planners and policymakers.46 For a long time now, Indian defense officials
have been warning their government in rather blunt
terms about the growing disparity between the two
Asian powers. The naval chief had warned that India
neither has “the capability nor the intention to match
China force for force” in military terms, while the former air chief had suggested that China poses more of
a threat to India than does Pakistan. But the political
leadership in India continued to act on the assumption
that Beijing is not a short-term threat to India but rather needs to be watched over the long term. However,
that assessment seems to be undergoing a change. After trying to ignore significant differences with China,
Indian decisionmakers finally are acknowledging that
the relationship between the countries is becoming
increasingly contentious. Prime Minister Singh has
suggested that “China would like to have a foothold
in South Asia and we have to reflect on this reality. . . .
It’s important to be prepared.”47 The Indian defense
minister has argued that China’s increasing assertiveness is a “serious threat.”48 A former national security
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advisor and special envoy to China, M. K. Narayanan,
has openly accused Chinese hackers of attacking
his website, as well as those of other government
departments.49
An elite consensus is evolving in India that China’s rise is posing problems for the country. “We are
friends, not rivals,” said the Chinese Premier in India
in 2010.50 But a growing number of Indians now see
China as a competitor, if not a rival. A 2010 Pew poll
suggested that only 34 percent of Indians held a favorable view of China, with four in 10 viewing their
neighbor as a “very serious threat.”51 More damaging
is the perception gaining ground in India that China
is the only major power that does not accept India as a
rising global player that must be accommodated. The
discord between the two countries thus remains entrenched, and their increasing economic strength and
geopolitical standing has only underlined their rapidly growing ambitions. Though it is not entirely clear
if China has well-defined policy objectives vis-à-vis
India, Beijing’s means, both economic and military,
to pursue its goals are greater than at any time in the
recent past. In response, a process of military consolidation and build-up of key external partnerships is
underway in India.
Between 2010 and 2016, India is expected to spend
$112 billion on capital defense acquisitions in what is
being described as “one of the largest procurement
cycles in the world.”52 The Indian Army is raising two
new specialized infantry mountain divisions (35,000
soldiers) and an artillery brigade for Arunachal
Pradesh aimed at redressing the imbalance on the
Sino-Indian border. It is also revising its conventional
warfighting doctrine that is aimed at deterring as opposed to dissuading China though its meaning in op-
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erational terms remains far from clear. The Indian military is currently refining a “two-front war” doctrine
to fend off Pakistan and China simultaneously. Both
fronts—the northeastern one with China and northwestern one with Pakistan—are being given equal
attention. If attacked by Pakistan and China, India
will use its new integrated battle groups to deal quick
decisive blows against both simultaneously.
The Indian Navy is aiming for a total fleet of 140145 vessels over the next decade, built around two carrier battle groups: the Admiral Gorshkov, handed over
to India in November 2013, and the indigenous carrier, the 37,500-ton STOBAR Air Defense Ship likely
to be completed by 2015. India’s ambition to equip
its navy with two or more aircraft carriers over the
next decade as well as its decision to launch its first
indigenous nuclear submarine are seen as crucial for
power projection and to achieve a semblance of strategic autonomy. India’s emerging capability to put a
carrier task force as far as the South China Sea and the
Persian Gulf has given a boost to the Indian Navy’s
blue-water aspirations and India hopes to add a third
aircraft carrier by 2017, ensuring that the Indian Navy
has two operational carriers at any given time.53 The
deployment of the Jin class submarine at Hainan by
China will also force India to speed up its indigenous
nuclear submarine project that has been in the making
for more than a decade now with the Indian Navy,
rather ambitiously, aiming at the induction of five indigenous advanced technology vehicle (ATV) nuclear
submarines. A submarine-based nuclear arsenal is
considered critical by Indian strategists to retain a
second-strike capability.
The Indian Navy took command in January 2012
from Russia of the nation’s first nuclear-powered
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submarine since India’s last such vessel was decommissioned in 1991. With the induction into the Indian
Navy of the Russian Akula-II class submarine K-152
Nerpa—now known as INS Chakra—India becomes
the world’s sixth nation to operate a nuclear powered
submarine.54
INS Chakra does not really add to India’s nuclear
muscle as it will not be armed with long-range nuclear
missiles. For that, the Indian Navy is still waiting for
INS Arihant, an indigenous nuclear submarine, which
is undergoing sea trials and is slated to become fully operational in 2014.55 INS Arihant was formally launched
by the Indian Prime Minister in 2009. This highly secretive project took more than a decade to complete
and will fill out India’s nuclear triad, with the submarine’s ballistic missiles giving India a second strike
capability.
What INS Chakra will do is to restore some muscle
to India’s underwater combat capability, which has
been steadily depleting with only 14 conventional submarines holding forth. The Indian Navy has also lost
critical expertise in maintaining and operating nuclear
submarines, and INS Chakra is expected to be used
for training sailors as well. India had leased a Russian Charlie-class nuclear submarine from the former
Soviet Union in 1988 for 3 years. Indian naval planners are looking at nuclear attack submarines as an
important element of their “denial strategy” (aiming
to deny opponents’ ability to use the sea, but without
seeking to control it themselves), and as a response to
any adversary’s “sea control” strategy. Not only does
a nuclear submarine enhance India’s credibility as a
major global military power, it is also seen as crucial
in cementing the Indian Navy’s blue-water status.
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India is using its naval forces to advance its diplomatic initiatives overseas and in particular towards
shaping the strategic environment in and around the
Indian Ocean. Indian interests converge with those of
the United States in the Indian Ocean region, and it
is trying to use the present upswing in U.S.-India ties
to create a more favorable strategic environment for
itself in the region despite its historic sensitivities to
the presence of U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean.56 The
United States has also recognized the importance of
India’s role in the region as was evident in Secretary
of State Colin Powell’s 2001 contention that it was
important for the United States to support India’s
role in maintaining peace and stability in the Indian
Ocean and its vast periphery.57 More recently, in its
first maritime service strategy update in 25 years, the
United States views its sea power as the primary instrument in the U.S. defense arsenal to deter conflict
with China, and cooperation with other countries’ naval services, including India’s, is recognized as crucial
to fulfilling the strategic imperatives in the region.58
The U.S. and Indian navies have stepped up their joint
exercises, and the United States has sold India the USS
Trenton (renamed INS Jalashwa), the first of its class
to be inducted into the Indian Navy and marking a
milestone in the U.S.-India bilateral ties. The United
States would like India to join its Container Security
Initiative (CSI) and Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI) but India remains reluctant. PSI is viewed as
a U.S.-led initiative outside the UN mandate while
the CSI would result in the presence of U.S. inspectors in Indian ports, making it politically radioactive.
However, India has indicated that it would be willing to join the U.S.-proposed 1,000-ship navy effort
to combat illegal activities on the high seas, given the
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informal nature of the arrangement.59 India is seen
as a balancer in the Asia-Pacific where the U.S. influence has waned relatively, even as China’s has risen.
India’s ties with Japan have also assumed a new dynamic with some even mooting a concert of democracies proposal involving the democratic states of the
Asia-Pacific working towards their common goals of a
stable Asia-Pacific region.60 While such a proposal has
little chance of evolving into anything concrete in the
near term, especially given China’s sensitivities, India’s decision to develop natural gas with Japan in the
Andaman Sea, and recent military exercises involving
the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, do give
a sense of India’s emerging priorities.61
India’s decision to establish its Far Eastern Command in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the
Bay of Bengal is aimed at countering China’s growing
presence in the region by complicating China’s access
to the region through the Strait of Malacca, the main
bottleneck of oil transit to China. India has launched
Project Seabird, consisting of the establishment of its
third operational naval base in Karwar on the nation’s
western seaboard, an air force station, a naval armament depot, and missile silos—all at securing the nation’s maritime routes in the Arabian Sea.62 India is set
to establish a monitoring station in Madagascar, its
first in another country, as it is deemed vital to guard
against the terrorist threat emanating from East Africa
as well as to keep an eye on China’s plan in the region.
India also has its eyes on Mauritius for developing a
monitoring facility at an atoll and has strengthened its
naval contacts with Mozambique and Seychelles. India responded to Chinese President Hu Jintao’s offer
of military assistance to Seychelles by donating one
of its patrol aircraft to the Seychelles Navy. India’s
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support in the building of Chahbahar port in Iran as
well as the road connecting it to Afghanistan is an answer to the Chinese-funded Gwadar port in Pakistan.
India’s air base in Kazakhstan and its space monitoring post in Mongolia are also geared primarily
towards China.
India’s “Look East” policy, originally aimed at
strengthening economic ties with its Southeast Asian
neighbors, has now led to naval exercises with Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia. The Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states
have joined the Indian Navy in policing the Indian
Ocean region to check piracy, trafficking, and other
threats to sea lanes. Indian engagement of East Asia
in the post-Cold War era has assumed significant proportions and remains a top foreign policy priority for
the Indian leadership. The government of P. V. Narasimha Rao launched its Look East policy in the early1990s explicitly to initiate Delhi’s re-engagement with
East Asia. Over the years, India has come to have
extensive economic and trade linkages with various
countries in the region even as there has also been a
gradual strengthening of security ties. Present Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has made it clear
that his government’s foreign-policy priority will continue to be East and Southeast Asia, which are poised
for sustained growth in the 21st century.
India, too, has an interest in protecting the sea lanes
of communication that cross the South China Sea to
Northeast Asia and the United States. As India’s profile rises in East and Southeast Asia, it is asserting its
legitimate interests in the East Asian waters. As China
expands its presence in South Asia and the Indian
Ocean region, India is staking its own claims in East
Asia. Most significant in this regard is India’s growing
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engagement with Vietnam. India has decided to work
with Vietnam to establish a regular Indian presence in
the region as part of a larger Delhi-Hanoi security partnership, with Vietnam giving India the right to use its
port of Nha Trang. Delhi and Hanoi have significant
stakes in ensuring security of sea lanes and preventing sea piracy, while they also share concerns about
Chinese access to the Indian Ocean and South China
Sea. Indian strategic interests demand that Vietnam
emerge as a major regional player and India is well
placed to help Hanoi achieve that objective. It has been
argued in Indian strategic circles that just as China has
used states in India’s periphery to contain India, Delhi
should build states like Vietnam as strategic pressure
points to counter China.63 A common approach on the
emerging balance of power is developing with India
and Vietnam both keen on reorienting their ties with
the United States as their concerns about China rise.
India has also accelerated its naval engagement
with a number of Persian Gulf states, making port
calls and conducting exercises with the navies of Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and United
Arab Emirates as well as engaging with the navies of
other major powers in the region such as the United
States, the United Kingdom (UK), and France. It has
also been suggested that to more effectively counter
Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean and to protect
its trade routes, India will have to seek access to the
Vietnamese, Taiwanese, and Japanese ports for the
forward deployment of its naval assets.64 India is already emerging as an exclusive defense service provider for smaller states with growing economies that
seek to strengthen their military capabilities in Southeast Asia and West Asia, such as Vietnam, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, Qatar, and Oman, providing it
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access to ports along the Arabian coast, Indian Ocean,
and South China Sea.65
India has moved to build strategic partnerships
with many states that share its apprehensions about
China: the United States, Russia, Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, and South Korea. India’s Look East policy
that started primarily as an attempt to try and integrate India’s newly liberalizing economy with that of
the Asian tigers has now evolved into a more robust
military-to-military partnership with important states
in the region. India is providing support to Vietnam
to enhance and upgrade the capabilities of its three
services in general, and its Navy in particular. India
is training Malaysia’s Su-30 pilots and the Singaporean Army practices on Indian soil using cantonments and firing ranges. Indian warships now regularly visit countries across the region from Australia to
Singapore and Indonesia.
While economic ties between India and South
Korea have been diversifying across various sectors,
defense cooperation between the two states has also
gathered momentum, reflecting the rapid changes in
the Asia-Pacific region’s balance of power caused by
China’s rise. In 2005, India and South Korea signed
a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation in Defense, Industry, and Logistics, which was
followed in 2006 by another MoU on cooperation between the two countries’ coast guards. South Korea
is one of the world’s leaders in naval ship-building
technology, and India would like to tap into South Korean naval capabilities to augment its own. As a result,
naval cooperation is rapidly emerging as a central
feature of bilateral defense working together with the
two navies cooperating in anti-piracy operations in
the Indian Ocean region and the Gulf of Aden.66 Both
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states also share a strong interest in protecting the sea
lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean region.
India is expanding its defense ties with Japan. Both
Japan and India rely on the security of the sea lanes
of communication for their energy security and economic growth. They have a shared interest in guaranteeing the free transit of energy and trade between the
Suez Canal and the Western Pacific. With this in mind,
they are developing maritime capabilities to cooperate with each other and other regional powers. The
navies of the two are now exercising regularly, and
the interactions between the coast guards is increasing
with a view towards combatting piracy and terrorism,
and cooperating on disaster relief operations.67 Japan
feels that only the Indian Navy in the region can be
trusted to secure the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean,
vital for Japan’s energy security. It is also important
for India to join hands with the much larger Japanese
Navy, Asia’s most powerful, to make sure that no adversarial power controls the regional waterways.
With a new robustness in its dealings with Beijing,
New Delhi is signaling that there are limits to what
is negotiable in Sino-Indian ties. In particular, it has
adopted a harder line on Tibet by making it clear to
Beijing that it expects China to reciprocate on Jammu
and Kashmir, just as India has respected Chinese sensitivities on Tibet and Taiwan. Overriding Chinese
objections, for example, the Indian government went
ahead and allowed one of its central universities, the
Indira Gandhi National Open University, to confer an
honorary doctorate on the Dalai Lama.68 This is the
same government that just a few years back sent a note
to all its ministers advising them against attending a
function organized by the Gandhi Peace Foundation
to honor the Dalai Lama so as to not to offend China.69
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Ignoring pressures from Beijing, India also decided to take part in the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony for
Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo in Oslo, Norway, in November 2010. Beijing asked several countries, including India, to boycott the ceremony or face its displeasure, describing the prize as open support for criminal
activities in China. India was among the 44 states that
decided to participate, even as states such as Pakistan,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq were among the
nations that did not attend. There were suggestions
that the Chinese Premier might cancel his India trip
in response, but nothing of the kind happened. Likewise, after Beijing began issuing stapled visas to the
residents of Jammu and Kashmir and then denied a
visa to the head of the Indian Army’s Northern Command, New Delhi reacted forcefully and hinted that
it was ready to review its long-standing Tibet and
Taiwan policies. India also declined to endorse the
“one China” policy during Wen’s visit to India, a departure from past statements.70 These developments
are further evidence that India is reassessing its policy
toward China as the latter’s faster-than-expected rise
has challenged the fundamentals of New Delhi’s traditional approach to Beijing. India’s robust partnership
with the United States, its burgeoning ties with East
and Southeast Asian nations as part of its Look East
policy and its military modernization are all aimed at
managing China’s dramatic rise.
Indian policy trajectory toward China is evolving
as India starts to pursue a policy of internal and external balancing more forcefully in an attempt to protect
its core interests. The government is trying to fashion
an effective response to the rise of China at a time of
great regional and global turbulence. Though it is not
entirely clear if there is a larger strategic framework
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shaping India’s China policy, India’s approach toward
China is indeed undergoing a transformation, the full
consequences of which will only be visible a few years
down the line.
THE U.S. ROLE IN THE SINO-INDIAN MATRIX
With Sino-Indian friction growing and the potential for conflict remaining high, the challenge to
India is formidable. India is increasingly bracketed
with China as a rising or emerging power—or even
a global superpower—though it has yet to achieve
the economic and political profile that China enjoys
regionally and globally. India’s main security concern
today is not the increasingly decrepit state of Pakistan
but rather an ever more assertive China, whose ambitions are likely to reshape the contours of the regional
and global balances of power with deleterious consequences for Indian interests.
India’s ties with China are thus gradually becoming
competitive, with a sentiment gaining ground among
Indian policy elites that China is not sensitive to India’s core security interests and does not acknowledge
its status as a global player. India is rather belatedly
gearing up to respond to China’s rise with a mix of
internal consolidation and external partnerships. The
most important element in this matrix is India’s emerging strategic partnership with the United States. New
Delhi has looked to Washington for support as both
Sino-Indian and Sino-U.S. competition has come into
sharper relief in recent years. As Sino-Indian ties pass
through a phase of turmoil, Washington will have to
play the critical role of a balancer with even greater finesse than before. The United States has a key stake in
the trajectory of Sino-Indian ties in view of the chang-
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ing balance of power in Asia and China’s growing assertiveness. As a new balance of power takes shape,
India will be an indispensable element in that architecture, even as the United States remains a key player
in managing the Sino-Indian dynamic. New Delhi will
not be part of an explicit alliance framework with the
United States against China but instead will look to
the United States to manage the power transition in
Asia and its attendant consequences.
The dichotomy between China and India’s global
convergence and their growing bilateral divergence
has allowed India to collude with China as a power
bloc against Western positions at the global level, even
as at the bilateral level New Delhi is not averse to leveraging its relationship with Washington in order to
constrain China. India’s burgeoning relationship with
the United States gives New Delhi some crucial strategic room to maneuver. China’s rapid global ascent
will bring the United States and India even closer, but
India’s traditional desire to retain strategic autonomy
will preclude the emergence of any formal structure
defining this bilateral relationship. India is beginning
to receive attention from Washington as a rising power on a par with China. This process should continue
with U.S. policymakers viewing Asia as a single region whose future will to a large extent be shaped by
the trajectory of Sino-Indian ties. America’s defense
ties with India should be mature enough to deal with
a range of problems in the Indo-Pacific. For this, the
defense establishments in both states need to be aware
of each other’s requirements. That process has only
just begun and needs greater political direction.
The United States faces the prospect of an emerging power transition in Asia, and a robust partnership
with India will go a long way towards stabilizing the

38

strategic landscape in the region. This is especially
true at a time when China’s faster-than-expected rise
is generating widespread apprehensions. The United
States should encourage New Delhi to enhance its
presence further in East and Southeast Asia. That
process is already underway, but India needs to do a
better job of articulating its readiness to emerge as a
credible actor in the region. The United States can help
by encouraging its allies and partners in the region to
engage with India more substantively.
Although it is clearly in the interest of both China
and India to stabilize their relationship by seeking out
convergent issue areas, a troubled history, coupled
with the structural uncertainties engendered by their
simultaneous rise, is propelling the two Asian giants
on a trajectory that they might find rather difficult to
navigate in the coming years. Pursuing mutually desirable interests does not inevitably produce satisfactory solutions to strategic problems. Sino-Indian ties
have entered turbulent times, and they are likely to
remain there for the foreseeable future.
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